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1  Introduction
How should  prices  be decontrolled,  slowly  or in a  big  bang?  Why is it
that  Goverbnents  committed  to  eventual  price  flexibility  so often  seem to  be
unable  to let  go of "temporary"  controls?  How  can  one explain  that  after  price
increases  early  in a program  of  price  controls,  one  often  sees  output  rise
while  at the  same time  shortages  seem  to increase  also (Bresser  (1987),  Ortiz
(1990))?  This  paper  argues  that  intertemporal  speculation,  hoarding  and the
political  economy  of price  reform  go a long  way towards  explaining  all  these
puzzles.  We show  that the  interaction  between  shortages  and  political
vulnerability  of reformist  governments  to early  perceptions  of failure  make
for  a strong  argument  against  gradualism  in the  decontrol  of prices.
Price  controls  have a long  and  disreputable  history.  Direct  controls
have often  been used  as substitutes  for,  rather  than  complements  of, regular
fiscal  and  monetary  restraint;  they  thus  ended  up suppressing  rather  than
curing  inflation.  More recently  they  have seen  more  sophisticated  use, as
transitional  devices  in  a series  of stabilization  programs  that  also
encompassed  orthodux  components  (Mexico  and  Israel  are  successful  examples).
The literature  on price  controls  is thin.  The  microeconomic  case  against
them  is  unassailable,  so the  literature  that  e.cists  focuses  on the  question  of
whether  their  use  can  be justified  on macroeconomic  grounds.  Dornbusch  and
Simonsen  (1987)  point  to  private  coordination  failures  as a rationale  for
price  controls  after  a tightening  of  mon-etary  policy.  Persson  and  van
Wijnbergen  (1989)  show that  the  use of  price  controls  can lower  the  cost to  a
government  with credibility  problems  of signaling  its  true type,  and thas the
transitional  unemployment  costs  of stabilization  programs  (cf  also  van
Wijnbergen  (1989)  for  arguments  along  this  line).  Calvo  (1988)  points  out  that
credibility  problems  present  a prima  facie  case  for  policy  intervention.
Mistaken  beliefs  cause  a wedge  between  marginal  rates  of substitution  and  true
rates  of transformation  and thus  present  a  distortion.
This  paper  abstracts  from  the  question  of why  price  controls  are  used.
Instead  it asks  a different  question,  one that  is  perhaps  of greater  practical
importance.  Assume  that,  for  reasons  good  or bad,  price  controls  are in  place;
how should  they  be terminated?  How to  escape  from  a period  of controls?  Both
the  coordination  failure  and the  signaling  approach  suggest  at most temporary2
use of controls,  in  order  to minimize  output  losses  on the transition  path
towa.-ci.  lower  inflation Shoule  in  such  an approach  contro'ls  be abolished
"cold  turkey"  or can  a case  be made  for  gradualism?  The issue  is in fact  of
much  wider importance;  all  of Eastern  Europe  has  been living  under  price
controls,  imposed  for  a  very different  reason.  How should  countries  like
Poland  or the  USSR  move towards  price  flexibility,  gradually  or in a "big
bang"?
Two  factors  complicate  the  issue  and  are  at the  core  of this  paper.  In
many cases  price  controls  focus  on commodities  like  basic  grains,  commodities
that  are  eminently  storable  and  can thus  be used in intertemporal  speculation.
This seems  to have  been acute  in for  example  Brazil,  where in 1985  a series  of
price  controls  were introduced  which  vhere  very  much seen  as temporary.
Bresser  (1987),  who was the  finance  minister  at the  time,  states:  "There  was
shortage  of merchandise  in stores  at the (same]  time  that  stocks  were
accummulating  in the  factories".
The second  factor  is that  opposition  to rapid  dismantling  of controls  is
often  based  on claims  of low  supply  response,  and  greatly  bolstered  if a
strong  supply  response  indeed  fails  to  materialise.  This is especially
relevant  in places  like  Eastern  Europe,  where  experience  with  price responsive
markets  is limited.  A less  benign  argument  also  lends  support  to a link
between  low supply  response  and  opposition  to relaxing  controls.  Shortages
create  rents,  and rents  will attract  lobbyists  in favor  of continuation  of
those  policies  that  create  the  rents.
We show the  difficulties  that  these  two factors  create  for  gradual
decontrol  of prices.  We endogenise  the  probability  of a collapse  of the  reform
program  along  the lines  of the  recent  literature  about  the  impact  of political
considerations  on economic  policy  (see  in  particular  Alesina  and Cukierman
(1990))  and show  that  such  endogeneity  in the  presence  of intertemporal
speculation  leads  to a strong  case  against  gradualism.  Our core  result  is a
forceful  argument  against  gradual  decontrol:  we show that  the  smaller  the
initial  price  increase  is,  the  lower  the  observed  supply  elasticity  and the
greater  the  probability  that  the  program  of reform  will in fact  be abandoned.3
2  Intertemporal  Speculation  and the  Supply  Response  to  Gradual
Price  Deco  rol.
2.1  The Basic  Model
Assume  a simple  traded/non-traded  disaggregation,  with the  country  a
price taker  in international  markets.  The  traded  sector  uses labor  only,  and
at constant  returns  to  scale;  thus  the  real  wage is fixed  in terms  of traded
goods  at say  w. In the  non-traded  sector,  production  technology  exhibits
decreasing  returns  to scale,  for  example  because  there  is  a fixed  factor  in
the  b-'.ground  (say  land);  unit  costs  are  therefore  an increasing  function  of
output.  There  are a large  number  of  producers  in the  N.1  sector,  so that  each
individual  producer  has a negligible  impact  on the  price,  or, in the  case  of
operative  price  controls,  on aggregate  shortages.  Producer  i's  output  today
equals  Yi,  and outptlt  tomorrow  yi.  Labor  is .he  only  variable  factor.  Each
producer  faces  exactly  the  same  technology  and  prices;  there  is  complete
symmetry.  The  cost function  for  current  (future)  production  equals  C (c):
C  C(w,  Yd),  C,  > 0,  C  >  12
C.  '1)
c  C(W,Y1 ),  cW > 0, YiC,  > 1
Capital  letters  represent  first  period  variables  and  lower  case letters  second
period  variables.  Decreasing  returns  imply  increasing  marginal  costa,
therefore  Cy and  cy,  are  both strictly  positive.  We will at one point  in
Section  5  assume  that,  at least  over  the  price  range  considered,  marginal
costs  increase,  but  at a  constant  or decreasing  rate:  Cyy, c  m  S  0. This
guarantees  that  marginal  costs  increase  at most linearly  as output  increases.
For  marginal  costs  t.o  be bounded,  the  third  order  derivatives  have to  become
strictly  negative  at some  stage,  but this  condition  is  unnecessarily  stringent
if imposed  over the  entire  feasible  output  range.  We return  to  what the  impact
of this  assumption  is in Sections  4 and 5.  Total  output  Y is the  summation
over  all i of individual  producers'  output  Y 1.
Output  produced  today  (Yi)  can  be sold today  or stored  for  sale
tomorrow.  Since  there  are  only two  periods,  o.utput  produced  tomorrow  (y 1) will4
be fully  so-  tomorrow.  There is  a storage  technology  4:  goods  put in storage
today,  Si,  are  related  to goods  available  from storage  in  period  2 according
to  the  technology  0:
Si  =  P(S);  (o)  0  O, 0  < (s1  (2)
If 0'. 1,  the only cost of holding inventories S for speculative reasons is
the interest  income  foregone  on the '.ncome  that  selling  in period  one  would
have  yielded.  With  O'  . 1,  part  of goods  stored  goes to  waste  due to facto.s
such as spoilage,  pests  and  so on,  Alternatively,  there  might  be positive
direct  marginal  costs  of storage  (direct  as opposed  to the indirect,
opportunity  cost  of interest  foregone  on the  ooney  tied  up in goods  in
storage).
The  market  clearing  price  in  period  1 (2)  is  P* (p°).  Controls  are
imposed  in the  non-traded  sector  only.  Before  the  anr'uncement  of decontrol,
prices were set at Po - po  <  p  p*  . A cold turkey approach to  decontrol
implies  the  announcement  of immediate  transition  to market  prices  in  both
periods.  Gradual  decontrol  implies  a price  incroase  in  period  1 that  falls
short  of going  to  market  prices:  P.  < P';  while  a full  .ove to  market  prices
is announced  for  period  two.
Call p the  probability  that  the  decontrol  program  will be abandoned.  We
assume  that  when the  program  of gradual  decontrol  is  abandoned  in  period  2,
the  controls  will  be kept  at their  level  of period  1, i.e.  in that  case  ps -
P8. A collapse  of the  cold turkey  decontrol  program  does  not  have such  an
obvious  default  position;  we assume  that  if the  cold turkey  program  collapses,
prices  in  period  two  will  be set  at the  pre-decontrol  level  po. 1/ In the  next
section  we will derive  p endogenously  by linking  it to aggregate  shortages.
But there  are too  many  producers  and  consumers  for  any individual  agent  to
believe  he or she  can influence  aggregate  quantities.  Thus both  producers  and
consumers  take  p as given,  although  they  are  aware  of the  link  between
aggregate  quantities  and  p.
1  One could  alternatively  have assumed  the same level  as obtains  under a
collapse  of the  gradual  regime;  this  would  lead  to the  same results.5
Producers
Consider  the  p,od&cer  problem  when a gradual  decontrol  program  has been
announced.  The produce'  has to choose  today's  output  Y and  level  of
inventories  S  before  knowing  whether  the  Government  will implement  its
announcements  for  period  two  or  whether  the  program  will  collapse  halfway.Z
However  second  period  output  can  be chosen  after  period  2  Government  policies
have  'ecome  clear.  The second  period  production  decision  is thus  a simple
static  optimization  problem:
No collapse:  Max,. p'  (y'  +  (Ss)  -c(w,y')  (3)
Collapse:  Maxy  Pg(y  +0(S))  -c(w,y 0 )
where  S is inherited  from  period  one  and thus  not  a decision  variable  anymore.
This leads  to the  standard  first  order  conditions:
Cy V)  = p':  Cy (Y,)  = Pg9(4
Thus  expected  second  period  output  equals:
9"  =  p  yg^1p)y  C  5)
Clearly,  cy(Rgy)  o  9,p  unless  cy  - 0.
In period  one  producers  have to  choose  output  Y and the  part of output
put in storage  S,  knowing  that in  period  two  the  '11  follow  the  rules  laid
out in equ. (4).  This leads  to the following  maximization  problem:
Maxy's  (Y  - S)Pg  - C(w,Y)  89'((y  +  (S))p  - C(W,y))  (6)
subject  to  0  s  S  s1  Y
6  is the  market  discount  factor:  6  - l/(l+r)  with r the real  interest  rate in
terms  of traded  goods.  6  is  exogenous  as we assume  open international  capital
markets. '  is the  expectations  operator.  9'p  equals:
2 Subscripts  i  are  omitted  where  that  can  be  done  without  causing  confusior..6
p(1  - p)  p;  + p  P.,;  Gradual  Decontrol  (7)
P=  (1  - P)  Pce  +  Pc;  Co#ld Turkey
In general  p^g  - p%t for  reasons  explained  below.  We will however  omit the
subscript  where this  does  not lead  to confusion.  The Lag-angean  problem
associated  with (6)  equals:
Min;,,  may,, L  - P(Y  - S)  C(w,  Y)  + 8*9 (p(y  + p (S))  -c(w,y))  (8)
+ Is  + g.(Y-  S)
with  associated  first  order  conditions:
Cy  a  Ps  IA  (9)
Pg  +  '8  Tsa  P  + A  - 0  =
The first  order  conditions  in  equ. (9)  indicate  that  output  will be
increased  until its  marginal  cost  equals  the  value  of an extra  unit of output.
This latter  value  equals  the  price  plus,  in the  first  period  only,  any
additional  shadow  price  pickcd  up by inventories  if they  are constrained  by
the  fact that  additions  to inventories  cannot  exceed  total  production  (i.e.
Cy  > P8 when  p  > 0).  As to inventories,  they  are increased  or decreased  so as
to equalise  the  value  of an  extra  unit of output  today  (P.)  with the
discounted  value  of an extra  unit tomorrow  (602'*p).  Of course  if inventories
hit  a corner  solution  (O  or Y), that  equality  cannot  be brought  about  and
either  A or A becomes  positive,  driving  a  wedge  between  the  marginal  benefit
of an extra  sale today  versus  an extra  sale  tomorrow.  Clearly,  higher  prices
lead to  higher  output  in  each  period:
dY  _  Cg  > 0:  c  3,(Y.)  >  0  d0  y , . O
d__dg_d1  ("  (10)
The  analysis  for "cold  turkey"  decontrol  follows  along  similar  lines;  just
replace  P.  by P*  and  8g  by Stt  throughout.7
Consumers
The consumer  chooses  between  Traded  (T)  and  Non-Traded  (NT)  goods  each
period,  and  allocates  expenditure  over today  and  tomorrow.  Aggregate  consumer
behavior  is approximated 3 by an expenditure  function;  in the  absence  of
rationing,  this function  gives  the  minimum  level  of expenditure  tG reach
welfare  level  U at the  given  intra-  and inter-  temporal  relative  price
structure:
E  Min  P'Ah  + Al  + 8  (pah  + a,)
subject  to:  U((Ah,IAf),  (ah,af))  a  U  (11)
=  E(I(P,1),8is(p,1),U)
A' (a')  is  real consumption  of good  i in period  one (two).  The derivatives  of
E with  respect  to prices  yield  the  Hicksian  demand  functions  (Dixit  and  Norman
(1980)).  U and  w are exact  price  indices  for  current  and future  consumption
corresponding  to the  utility  structure  underlying  (8).  We assume  that  II  and  X
are  compatible  with the  assumption  of unchanging  static  preferences  accross
periods.
However,  when  price  controls  are  b -ding, consumer  dema.wd  is  not  met at
quoted  prices.  In that  case  we can  define  virtual  prices,  v!.ich  are the  prices
at which  consumers  would  willingly  consume  the  rations  allocated  to them (see
Neary  and  Roberts  (1980)):
P,  ItPv a,  *  A*)  R PV:  4RP  . =  AR  (12)
where ARh  is the ration allocated in period 1 and a,h  the ration allocated  in
3 This is an approximation  for two reasons.  First,  as introduced  below,
consumers  have heterogenous  expectations  about  supply  el:-.s,cities  and  hence,
presumably,  about  future  prices.  This introduces  an ag.,r.>gation  error.  Sec,nd,
one  should  use the  certainty  equivalent  of the  second  period  price  rather  than
the  expected  value.  Since  the  indirect  utility  function  is  convex  in  prices,  the
two  are  not  the  same.  The  difference  cannot  be  signed  a  priori,  however,  and  will
be ignored.8
period  2.  Undei the  preference  structure  assumed  sofar,  it is  easy to show
that:
pg < Po < Pv  ; Pt7  <  P" <  P,  (13)
Consumer  behavior  is furthermore  restricted  by the intertemporal  buLget
constraint  consumers  face.  In the  case  of gradualism,  that  constraint  aquals:
Yr  g  ;9  (Y  - S)  -C.  + 6(  r  p  (y  +  s)  -c)  aE  (14)
while  under  a cold turkey  approach  we get:
Yr +  P  (Y  -S)  -C  4  S (t  p  (Y  + S)  C)E  (15)
YT is output  in  the traded  good  sector.  The  welfare  gain 'lie  to . small
increase  in the  ration  is  .roportional  to the  wedge  between  conttolled  and
virtual  prices  (Neary  and  Roberts  (1980)):
Eu -AUh  = (P  - Pg)  (16)
For  given  collapse  probability  p (which  will  be endogenized  in  the  next
section),  the  model is  closed  in  each  period  by eicher  a market  clearing
equation  for the  NT market  in case  market  prices  prevail,  or by an equation
defining  virtual  prices  if  price  controls  are  operating  and  binding.  The
latter  case is  described  by equations  (12).  Without  price  controls,  market
prices  follow  from  NT goods  market  equilibrium:
y  S  =E
(17)
y  t  ( (s4) e
If  controls  operate  in one  period,  and  market  prices  in the  other,  the
appropriate  sub-equations  from (9)  and (14)  need to  be selected.9
2.2  Aggregate  Supply  Response,  Hoarding  and  Gradualism.
To bring  out the  structure  of the  problem,  consider  first  a simplified
setup,  without  direct  costs  of Inventory  holding:  O'  - 1, and thus  s  S.
Assume  there  is  enough  curvature  in the  cost functions  to always  guarantee
positive  output  in  each  period.  But for  positive  Y it is clear  that  A and A
cannot  be positive  simul.aneously:  If  Y >  0, S caz1.aot  simultaneously  be at the
0 and  Y bounuary.  Consider  first  the  case  where  A >  0,  M - 0. The  first  order
conditions  then  simplify  to:
cy  Pg;  Cy  - Og  p  (18A)
pPg  1  _-  ;  A  > 0  (18B'
Si-nce  A  >  0. there  is  no inventory  holding:  S - 0, and  all  output  is  produced
for  sale in the  period  in  which  it is actually  produced.
Supply  Response  to Gradual  Decontrol:  no  storage  costs
Y  -y-  -_____
V  -Y  -S
._________________  Collapse Probability
0  >a  X>O  1
Figure  1
The output  levels  clearly  depend  on the  actual  or (for  period  two)  the
expected  level  of prices.  Call  the  output  level  produced  for initial  price  P.10
and in the  absence  of any  production  for  inventories  Y..  Because  Cy  > 0, Ps  >
PO implies  Y8 >  Yo.  Thus ,  if A > 0, there  is a  positive  supply  response  to
the  program  (Fig.l).  (18B)  indicates  under  which  circumstances  this  will in
fact  happen  the  expected  rate  of price  increase  has to  be lower  than  the
nominal  rate of interest.  In case  of full  credibility  (p  - 0), this implies
that  relative  price  of the  controlled  commodity  cannot  rise faster  than  the
world  real rate  of interest.
Consider  next the  case  where  A - 0, p  >  0. In this  case the  first  order
conditions  beco,ne:
Cy  =PO,  + p;Cy a  tg  p  (19A)
a  +  =j.  >1  (19B)
Pg  Pg
In this  case,  output  in  period  one is in fact  higher,  from (19A),  because  CW
>  0 and  M > 0. Compare  (18A)  and (19A)  and  note that  first  period  marginal
revenue  in 19A  is  higher  with  p  >  0, leading  to  higher  output  in this  case.
But, in  a rather  extreme  reversal  from the  A > 0 case,  all  of it is stored  for
the  future  period:  As  > 0  *  S - Y. So although  output  is in fact  higher,  supply
actually  reaching  the  market  has  completely  dried  up;  all  output  is  hoarded
for  sale  in the  future,  when  prices  will  be even  higher.  The reason  for it
becomes  clear  from (18B):  prices  are  actually  rising  faster  than  the  rate  of
interest  (A  > 0),  thus  making  storage  for  future  sale  more profitable  than
producing  for  the  current  market.  4/
Since  U8  p depends  on the  collapse  probability  p, that  collapse
probability  has  an important  impact  on which  regime  will  actually  prevail.
Figure  1  ties the  different  solutions  together  as a function  of p. It  shows
the  aggregate  supply  response,  for  given  first  period  price  increase,  as a
4  In  the  borderline  case  where  prices  rise  at  exactly  the  rate  of interest,
A-js-0,  and  producers  are indifferent  between  selling  today  versus  hoarding.  It
is natural to assume  that in that case the demand side will determine  the
outcome,  i.e.  no hoarding,  since  consumers  are rationed  in period  1.  This case
is  much  more important  in  the  case  analyzed  below,  with  direct  costs  of  holding
inventories.11
function  of the  credibility  of the  program.  A higher  p indicates  a lgwer
credibility  of the  program.  The  diagram  indicates  that,  as p increases,  it
reaches a threshold  level  p0 at  which  the  expected  rate  of price  increase
falls  to below  the  rate  of interest  as the  likelihood  that  the  second  stage
will  not  be implemented  goes  up.  Above that  threshold,  the  incentive  for
hoarding  falls  away  and,  while  output  does  not increase,  the  share  of it  that
reaches  the  market  does.  With  very low  credibility  (very  high  p), there  is  no
reason  to produce  for  inventories,  which  leads  to  a smaller  increase  in output
but  everything  is  delivered  to today's  market.  Thus the  observed  supply
response  is  positive.  However,  in the  opposite  case,  with  high probability  of
success  (low  p),  the likelihood  of high future  prices  is  high,  and  with it the
incentive  to  hoard.  Therefore  in the  case  of a low  p, the  observed  supply
elasticity  is in fact  negative.
Consider  next the  more  realistic  case  with  positive  physical  costs  of
storage, O'  < 1. We assume that there are positive marginal costs to storage,
and  that  they increase  with  the  amount  stored.  It  becomes  harder  and  harder  to
protect  supplies  from  animals,  pests,  spoilage  or theft  as they  become
bulkier.  Formally,  these  assumptions  imply  4'  <  1  and  6''  < 0. This leads  to
the  First  order  conditions  listed  in  equs.  (20A-B):
Cy  Pg  :  ;  Cy (y)  p;  Cy (y)  = Pg  (20A)
. A  X.j  =l  (2(0B)
Pg  Pg
Fig.2  below  helps  in  understanding  the  solution  to the  set  of equations
listed  in (20A-B).  It lists  on the  vertical  axis the  rate  of return  on holding
inventories,  f  - (60''s  p)/P 8), as a function  of S, the  amount  of inventories
held.  Contrary  to the  case  we just  analyzed  (0'-l),  S does  have an impact  on
this  rate  because  changes  in  S change  marginal  storage  costs  O'.  As the  amount
stored  increases,  marginal  storage  costs  rise.  Therefore  the  rate  of return  on
holding  inventories  falls  with the  amount  stored  (the  downward  sloping  curve
in  Fig.2).  Call the  intersection  between  this  curve  and the  horizontal  line  at
1  S*.  At that  point  the  rate  of return  on inventories  equals  the  rate  of12
interest.  Note that  contrary  to the  0'-1  case,  this  equality  only  holds  at S';
consequently  producers  want to hold  S*,  rather  than  being  indifferent  between
selling  today  or tomorrow  as was  the  case for  A-p-0,  '  - 1.




In turn,  from (20B)  it follows  that  in the  region  to the  left  of Se,
labeled  "A"  in fig.  2, p  > 0 and  A  0. Analogously,  to the  right  of S*,  in
the  region  labeled  "B",  A > 0 and  p  - 0. But that  suggests  that  regions  A and
B cannot  be solutions  to the  equations  (20A-B):  1  > 0 implies  S - Y >  S,
which  is inconsistent  with  being  in  A to  begin  with.  A similar  argument  rules
out region  B. Thus, if there  is  an intersection  at all, the  solution  to (20A-
B) is A - p - 0, S - S*,  Y - Y.
If there  is  no intersection  for  any  S e (0,  Y.),  one  of the  corner
solutions  will obtain.  If for  all  possible  values  of S,  f  < 1, there  will
never  be any inventory  holding  since  prices  are  expected  to rise  too  slowly.
This is  only relevant  for  price  reforms  from  a relatively  undistorted  starting13
point.  We will therefore  not  consider  this  case  anyfurther.  At the  other
extreme  is the  case  where  for  all feasible  S,  f  remains  above 1.  This  means
that  prices  are  expected  to rise  rapidly  at any  level  of  inventories,  more
than  enough  to offset  high  marginal  storage  costs.  In that  case all  current
output 5/ will  be hoarded.
YY-q  ,S  Net  Aggregate  Supply  and  the probability  of Collapse
High Pg HS
i1  <  12




Consider  S*  and the  A-p-o  case in  more detail  (Figure  3).
Differentiating  (20B)  indicates  the  relation  between  the  optimal  level  of
hoarding  S*  and  the  collapse  probability  p:
dSjjl  VW  - Pg)  5  <  (21)
dp  pi,  `9  fP"+  p
5 Which  will exceed  Yg  since Cy  Ps  +A>  Ps,14
Clearly,  expected  prices  depend  on the  likelihood  the  private  sector  attaches
to the  reform  being  abandoned.  A greater  likelihood  of collapse  implies  a
greater  likelihood  of no price  rise  between  today  and tomorrow,  and thus
reduced  hoarding  incentives.  On the  other  hand,  reduced  storage  (lower  S)
reduces  marginal  storage  costs  and  thus  increases  the  return  on inventory
holding.  Ai credibility  declines  and  p  moves  up,  hoarding  declines  and thus,
odd  as it  may sound  initially,  the  observed  supply  response  Y - S actually
increases.  This is indicated  by the  upward  sloping  line  labeled  HS (for
Hoarding  Schedule)  in  Figure  3. In fact if  credibility  is low  enough,  a corner
solution  may  be reached  where  no intertemporal  speculation  is  profitable  and
the  corner  solution  associated  with A >  0 is  reached  (the  flat segment  in
Figure  3).  This is clearly  the  case for the  extreme  outcome  of no credibility
at all (p  - 1).  At p - 1, prices  are in  fact  not  expected  to  rise  at all,
there  will therefore  not  be any  hoarding  and  the  HS curve  intersects  the  p - 1
axis at Yg.
Compare  next two  different  stabilization  programs,  each "gradualist":
prices  are  moved  partially  in  period  one  but fully  liberalized  in period  two.
However,  one  program  is  more tradualist  than  the  other  in that  the initial
price  response  is smaller  ("Low  P."  versus  "High  P.").  First  of all,  a higher
first  period  control  price  P 8 increases  the  optimal  level  of first  period
output  for  given  incentives  to  hoard (cf  equ. (9)).  This means  that the  flat
part  of the  hoarding  schedule  (where  hoarding  is  zero and  output  at Y.),
shifts  up by the  increase  in  Y.:
Al  =  dYg = C¢ >  0  (22)
Also,  higher  initial  prices  mean lower  percentage  capital  gains  once the
market  is liberalized.  Thus the  incentive  to  hoard  will,  ceteris  paribus,
decline:
dSP  =  P  ,  /  p)  <  O  (23)
Therefore:15
A2 =  Al  dP  > A
dP pcse
A2 >  Al  means that  the  curved  segment  of the  diagram  in fact  shifts  up more
than the  flat  part.  This implies  that  the  point  where  hoarding  becomes
unprofitable  moves  to the left (cf  Fig. 3,  move  from the  "low  P8 . schedule  HS
towards  the "high  P 8" schedule  HS').  Also,  with a  higher  P.,  there  will  be
less first  period  rationing,  and  hence  less  spill  over into  the  market  for
second  period  home goods (note  that  EP >  0).  Thus  p*  will  be lower,  further
reducing  hoarding  incentives  and  hence  shifting  the  area  where  X - o further
to the left.  The  main result  is that,  for  given  collapse  probability  p, bolder
decontrol  programs  (larger  initial  price increases)  will lead to less
hoarding,  larger  increases  in  output,  and  as a consequence,  much less  problems
with shortages.
However,  this  result  is  conditional  on a given  collapse  probability  and
thus  carries  little  weight  as long  as we do not  know  what happens  to the
collapse  probability  in response  to a  bolder  program  of price  decontrol.  This
question  is dealt  with in the  next section.
3  Shortages  and  the  Probability  of Reform  Failure
The analysis  presented  in the  previous  section  was incomplete  in that
the  probability  of collapse,  which  features  both in  consumers'  savings  and
producers'  hoarding  decisions,  was kept  exogenous.  In  most of the literature,
credibility  of stabilization  programs  or more  generally  of policy  reforms  is
either  also  kept exogenous  (Calvo  (1988),  van Wijnbergen  (1989))  or  hits a
corner  solution  (full  credibility  or none at all)  in a separating  equilibrium
(Persson  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1989),  Vickers  (1988)).  Assuming  exogenous
credibility  clearly  limits  the  usefulness  of the  analysis  severely,  since  the
impact  of any policy  will  depend  very  much on  whether  it is likely  to be
sustained  or not. Persson  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1989)  use the  signaling
equilibrium  approach,  which  goes to the  other  extreme  by only  considering
policies  that from  an .ncentive  compatibility  view point  are  fully  credible.
However,  the  Mexican  experience  with  extreme  fiscal  orthodoxy  backed  up in a16
later  stage  by more "heterodox"  elements  (cf  Ortiz (1990))  suggests  that  the
clean  solution  promised  by their  separating  equilibria  is in fact  hard to
achieve.
In  pioneering  papers,  Ize  and  Ortiz (1987)  and Dornbusch  (1989)
attempted  to  endogenise  credibility  in  a macroeconomic  setting,  linking
credibility  to  various  macroeconomic  variables.  The equilibria  they  consider
have many  prima  facie  plausible  features.  But their  reliance  on what is
basically  an arbitrary  relation  between  program  credibility  and  macro
variables  makes  one  wonder  whether  that  relation  itself,  for  all its  empirical
plausibility,  would  not  be affected  by economic  policy.  Thus a more rigorous
approach  to the  determination  of program  credibility  is  called  for.  an
approach  that  maintains  the  same theoretical  rigor  as the  signaling
equilibrium  approach,  but  allows  for  some  of the  fuzziness  that  seems  so hard
to avoid  in  practical  policy  making.  In this  paper  we break  new ground  by
drawing  on recent  innovations  in the  analysis  of the  impact  of political
considerations  on economic  policy  to find  a solution  to this  problem.  6/
Intuition  suggests  a link  between  aggregate  shortages  in the  early
stages  of the  program  and the  likelihood  that the  program  will be abandoned
halfway  (i.e.  that  controls,  contrary  to announcements,  are  not lifted  in
period  two).  There  are  of course  many  ways in  which  a reform  program  can  be
aborted.  Government  officials  may  be bribed  by lobbyists  seeking  the  rents
created  by the  price  controls.  A Balance  of Payments  crisis  may make it
impossible  to continue  the  exchange  rate  policy  on which  many  such  de-control
programs  are  built.  The  political  opposition  may gather  strength  if the
initial  results  are  disappointing.  Which  specific  mechanism  is  most relevant
probably  depends  on the  circumstanc,us  in the  country  under  consideration:  but
one  would  expect  similar  results  for  each.  In this  paper,  we focus  on
political  opposition,  arguably  the  most  relevant  one if one  has Eastern  Europe
in  mind.
At the  beginning  of period  2,  before  the  Government  can implement  the
second  stage  of its  reform  program,  we assume  it  has to face  a vote  which  will
determine  whether  it  can continue  or whether  the  opposition  takes  over.
6  See Cukierman  and Liviatan (1990)  for an interesting,  although  very
different,  approach  to the  same  problem.17
Alternatively,  in  a less  democratic  interpretation,  the  Government  may  be
forced  to change  its  course  of economic  policy  if unrest  due to economic
discontent  becomes  too  widespread.  Call the  probability  that this  happens  p.
We showed  in the  previous  section  that  p has  a substantial  impact  on first
period  hoarding  behavior.  The  key question  then is,  what determines  p?
Assume  that  voters  are  divided  in their  assessment  of  whether  free
markets  will indeed  outperform  a controlled  economy  in supplying  goods  to
consumers.  The  opposition  argues  that  supply  elasticities  are  too low  to
expect  any  benefits  from  price  decontrol.  We parametrise  this  divergence  of
views  by assuming  that  voters  have different  priors  on the  aggregate  supply
elasticity  in the  NT sector.  7/  There  is a  continuum  of voters,  indexed  by s.
For  analytical  convenience,  we assume  that  each  voter's  prior  can  be
represented  by the  normal/inverted-r  distribution  commonly  used in Bayesian
analysis.  This distribution  retains  its  structure  as new data  are  used to
update  it (i.e.  it is  a natural  conjugate  distribution).
Define  a  - (d(Y-S)/dP) 8/, and call  the  prior  and  posterior  density
function  of voter  s  ppr(a(s))  and  pp(a(s))  respectively.  apr  is the  prior's
mean and  aw  the  mean  of the  posterior  distribution.  Voters  enter  period  one
with a  particular  prior  distribution,  formed  in  periods  before,  and  observe
output  response  in period  one. They  use  that information  to update  their  prior
into the  posterior  distribution  used to form (rational)  expectations  about  the
likely  election  outcome  in  period  2.  Voters  are  ranked  in ascending  order  of
apr.  Voters  for  whom  a(s)  >  0  vote in favor  of the  Government,  and  voters  for
whom  a(s)  s 0 vote  against  it.  9/
There is  straight  majority  voting,  therefore  the  median  voter,  s,,  casts
7  The  traded  sector  is  not  really  an issue  since  there  what  is  not  supplied
domestically  can  be imported.
8  Purely  presentational  reasons  make  it  more  convenient  to  define  a  as  d(Y-
S)/dP  instead  of  as  the  elasticitv  (P/(Y-S))*d(Y-S)/dP.  For  lack  of  a  better  word
we  will  nevertheless  occasionally  use  the  word  elasticity  when  we  have  a  in  mind,
although  of course  d(Y-S)/dP  is  not  an elasticity.
I  Any other  cut-off  level  leads  to similar  results  as long  as the supply
response  can exceed  or fall short of the cut-off level  chosen.  The appendix
indicates  how a  cut-off level can be derived directly from voter welfare
maximization.18
the  decisive  vote.  0 Voters  know  their  own  preferences  and form  rational
expectations  about  economic  aggregates,  but they  do not  know every  other
voter's  preferences.  In  particular  they  do not  know the  magnitude  of a(sm),
the  median  voter's  estimate  of the  supply  ela_.icity.  Voters'  beliefs  on the
magnitude  of a(sm)  can  be summarized  by a density  function  f.  We assume  f to
be the  same  accross  voters.  'I/  Since  the  median  voter  determines  the
election  outcome,  the  probability  that  the  Government  will  be voted out  before
it  can implement  the  second  part  of its  gradual  decontrol  program  equals  the
probability  that  a(s,)  <  0:
0
p  = Pr(au2  < O)f= f  f(am,,) da,,  (25)
a,j  -a
All  voters  use  Bayes'  rule to  urdate  their  priors.  Thus if a supply
response  different  from  e voter's  prior  is  observed  in the  first  stage  of the
program,  voters  revise  their  prior;  it is straightforward  to show that:
apO  tap,+  (1  - ,)  (-  °  p )  *-26) .pg  - P  (26)
=  (1  -,)+  (1  Y-  - S)  - aG)
pg  - P
with 0 < 2  < 1. 'i  determines  the  relative  weight  of old and  new information  in
forming  the  posterior  out  of the  prior  and  the likelihood  of the  current
observation.  The  precise  expression  for  *  can  be found  in Zellner  (1974)  and
depends  on the  subjective  relative  variances  in the  prior  distribution  and  the
likelihood  function.  Note that  the  voter  will not  assume  a zero  variance  in
the  likelihood  function  for the  period  1  events  even  though  all  uncertainty  in
10  It is not implausible  to assume  that a vote early in a major reform
program is going to be dominated  by whether  voters  do or do not support  the
program.  With such  a  single  issue  contest,  medium  voter  models  are  thought  to  be
plausible  descriptions  of  how  voting  mechanisms  are  likely  to  work (cf  Enelow  and
Hinnich  (1984)  or Hillman  (1990)).
1 A  similar  device  to  introduce  uncertainty  about  election  outcomes  is  used
in  Alesina  and  Cukierman  (1990).19
the  model  refers  to period  2.  Bounded  rationality  makes  hlim  consider  only
cuLxent  price  information  in assessing  the  period  1 supply  response,  so  he
will still  observe  what looks  to the  econometrician  as positive  variance,  as
inventory  fluctuations  trigger  prediction  errors  in  his static  producer  model.
To assess  how hoarding  in period  1 12/ affects  the  probability  of
collapse  of the  program  of price  decontrol,  we need to focus  on how the
updating  process  will affect  f(am).  After  all,  while  voters  do not  know each
other's  individual  preferences,  they  do know from  each  other  that  each  voter
updates  using  equ. (26).  With Bayesian  updating,  updating  will  shift  f(am)
such that  f contracts  towards  the  voter  who  has a prior  mean equal  to the
elasticity  actually  observed  in  period  1. But  the  voter  with zero  prior  mean
is  more relevant,  since  0 is the  cut-off  point  for  the  voting  procedure.
Equ. (26)  shows  that  the  voter  at 0 will shift  up, down  or stay  where  he
is  depending  on whether  the  observed  supply  elasticity  in  period  1 is
positive,  negative  or zero.  All  voters  whose  prior  mean  exceeds  the  supply
elasticity  observed  with  hoarding  rev,-o  their  estimata  of the  supply
elasticity  downward.  Thus if enough  hoarding  takes  place  to make the  net
supply  response  negative,  f shifts  to the left (i.e.  its  mean falls)  and  more
weight  is concentrated  in the  part of f defined  over (--  ,  0).  The  probability
of  collapse  therefore  increases  if there  is enough  hoarding  to actually  cause
a net  negative  supply  response:
g  0y f  (a,,)  I-f  (CC,,  +  A,)  ; A..  - U  - 1)  (  P:  ,P°  OCm)
o~~~P  P
Y9  (-  Yo  -. ) -_  P(0)  (  |  (fa)  f  (a,)  'da'.
o'a  (27)
f  f (fa.)  da.,a
>  o  if (rg-YO-S)  <  0
<  0  if (Yg-YO-S)  >  O
A positive  supply  response  leads  to  an upwards  revision  of aprior  by at
12 Hore accurately,  anticipated  hoarding  in  period  1.  Note that  all  agents
form  rational  expectations  about  all  aggregate  variables  in the  economy.20
least  all  voters  whose  prior  had a  negative  mean. (27)  also shows  that  in that
case the  integral  of f(a 5) from  minus infinity  to zero  decreases.  A downward
revision  of p after  a negative  net supply  response,  but an upward  revision  of
p after  a positive  net supply  response,  leads  to the  negative  relation  between
p and  net aggregate  supply  response  represented  by the  schedule  VDS, for
Voters  Dissatisfaction  Schedule,  in  Fig.  4 below.
Impact of  Aggregate  Supply  Response  on Collapse  Probability
Yg  - yo- S  v
0  p
Figure  4
Which  way  will this  locus  shift  when a more  gradual  reform  is
implemented  (i.e.  a smaller  price  increase  (Pg  - P 0) in  period  1)?  Using  the
expression  for  p(O)  and  differentiating  (27)  indicates  the  answer:
apS)  (  Y9_po-  )  (Ya-YO-S) ap  (S)  PE  gP.
apg  (p  -P P,)2  (28)
< 0  <0
(Yg-YO-S)
> 0  >021
In interpreting  equ. (28),  consider  again  the  voter  with  zero prior  mean
first.  Assume  that in  response  to the  smaller  price  increase  enough  hoarding
takes  place  to  just offset  the  increase  in  output  (which  itself  is sma'ler
than  under  the  larger  price  increase).  Equ. (26)  indicates  that the  zero prior
mean  voter  will then  once  again  not change  his prior.  This  means that  after  a
low  price  increase  the  voters  dissatisfaction  schedule  VDS'  will go through
the  same  point  at zero  net  supply  response  as it  will  after  a  high price
increase  (compare  VDS and  VDS' in Figure  4); p(O)  will  not  be affected.
For  any  given  net supply  response  larger  than  zero,  the  same  quantity
response  to a smaller  price  change  implies  a larger  elasticity  and  thus  a
larger  upward  revision  from  any  given  prior.  This in turn  implies  a larger
shift  to the  right  of the  probability  density  function  f and  hence  a steeper
decline  in p (see  the  part  of VDS' above  0 in  Figure  4).  A similar  line  of
reasoning  applies  to the  case  of negative  supply  response.  Any given  negative
response  represents  a more  negative  supply  elasticity  than  the  corresponding
one  for the  high P.  case since  for the  same  quantitity  response  the  price
change  is smaller.  This implies  a larger  shift  to the  left (downward  revision
of prior  means)  and  thus  a higher  collapse  probability  in the  low  P8 case than
in the  high P8 case.  All this  makes  for  a counterclockwise  rotation  of the  VDS
schedule,  to  VDS' in Figure  4, in  response  to a  more gradualist  (lower  P.)
decontrol  program.  13/
4  Gradualism,  Intertemporal  Speculation  and the  Political  Economy  of
price  Reform
With the  two  building  blocks  (the  Hoarding  Schedule  HS and  the  Voters
Dissatisfaction  Schedule  VDS)  derived,  we are ready  to examine  the
consequences  on credibility  and  aggregate  supply  response  of a gradual  price
decontrol  program  (Figure  5 below).
13  Note that equ. (28),  being  a derivative,  gives  the response  of p to a
larger  P8.22
Hoarding.  Collapse Probabilities and Price Decontrol:
A Rational  Expectations  Equilibrium
Y  -S 
a  p  1
Figure  5
HS in Figure  5 indicates,  for  given  collapse  probability  p, how  much
producers  choose  to hoard.  A higher  collapse  probability  leads  to lower
expected  future  prices  and  thus  gives  less  of an incentive  to  hoard.  The  HS
locus  therefore  slopes  up.  But more  hoarding  lowers  the  2erceive supply
elasticity  and therefore  the  voters'  assessment  that  the  program  is failing;
this  in turn increases  the  probability  that the  Government  will be voted  out.
Thus the  political  economy  schedule  VDS slopes  downward  (FIgure  5).
Rationality  requires  that  the  probability  of program  collapse  used in
producers'  hoarding  decisions  will indeed  come out if those  hoarding  decisions
are in fact implemented.  This  will  be the  case at E, the  intersection  of the
Hoarding  Schedule  and the  Voters  Dissatisfaction  Schedule.  Thus E represents  a
rational  expectations  equilibrium  for  a given  gradual  decontrol  policy  that
sets first  period  prices  at P.  and  promises  to liberalise  in  period  2. At PE,
producers  hoard  SE for  a total  (negative)  supply  response  Ya,E - YO - SE.  In23
turn,  such  a negative  supply  respot,se  leads  to a private  revision  of the
collapse  probability  that  exactly  matches  PE. Thus E  is an internally
consistent  equilibrium:  producers  take intertemporal  decisions  based  on an
assessment  of the  collapse  probability  that  is in fact  consistent  with the
likely  political  response  to initial  refcrm  failure  given  those  producers
decisions.
The equilibrium  at E has  many plausible  features.  Output  in fact  rises,
as current  prices  do increase. 14/ Thus the  initial  unemployment  costs  of such
a decontrol  will be quite  small  or even  absent.  However,  in spite  of increased
output  and  higher  prices,  net supply  actually  reaching  the  market  declines  as
producers  increase  inventories,  hoping  for  later  capital  gains.  As a
consequence,  shortages  develop,  to the  point  that  the  net  observed  supply
elasticity  is in fact  negative.  This in turn  generates  pressure  against  the
decontrol  policy,  increasing  the  probability  that  the  program  will  have to  be
abandoned  for  a prolonged  period  of controls  before  the  final  deregulation
phase is reached.
Consider  the  consequences  of a  more cautious  start  of the  program  (a
lower  initial  period  level  of the  controls).  A lower  initial  price,  for  given
collapse  probability  p, results  in larger  capital  gains  once  prices  are
liberalized.  Thus for  given  p, hoarding  will in fact  increase  (HS  shifts  down
to  HS' in  Figure  5. If p  would  not  change,  the  new  equilibrium  would  be at A
in Figure  5.  Of course  more  hoarding  implies  a more  negative  perceived  supply
elasticity,  which  in turn leads  to  a higher  p.  Thus, if the  VDS schedule
itself  would  not shift,  a new  equilibrium  would  emerge  at A',  with  more
hoarding  and  higher  collapse  probability:  PA' >  PE.  But  there  is  more:  for
given  net aggregate  supply  response,  a lower  elasticity  is implied,  because  it
is in response  to  a smaller  price  change;  priors  thus  get  revised  downwards
more than  they  would  under  the  less  gradual  decontrol  program  and the  collaRse
probability  increases  (VDS  shifts  out  to VDS').  Thus the  new equilibrium  is at
E',  with an unambiguously  higher  probability  of collapse;  PE' >  PAW >  PE. Thus
14  See  Ortiz  (1990), Bresser  (1987) and  Helpman  (1989), covering
respectively  Mexico,  Brazil  and  Israel.  The  Brazilian  and  Mexican  stabilization
programs  of  respectively  1986  and  1988  fit  the  assumptions  made  here  particularly
well: there were substantial  price increases  at the beginning of what was
announced  as a temporary  use  of price  controls  (Bresser  (1987),  Ortiz  (1990)).24
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But, although  there  will  be an unambiguously  lower  output  response  to
more gradual  decontrol  (since  the  initial  price  is lower),  the  impact  on net
aggregate  supply  is less  clear.  On the  one  hand,  there  is  more  hoarding  for
given  p since  the  capital  gain then  increases;  but on the  other  hand there
will  be less  hoarding  because  p in fact  increases,  thus  reducing  the
likelihood  that  this  larger  capital  gain  will in fact  materialise.  However,  it
is clear  from  Figure  5 thpt the  net supply  response  inclusive  of hoarding  will
remain  negative  if it  was so to  begin  with.
The same  machinery  can  be used to  assess  "cold  turkey"  decontrol
approaches.  Under  a cold  turkey  approach,  prices  are immediately  and fully
liberalized.  Thus if the  approach  is  maintained,  prices  will  be market
determined  in  both  periods.  Under the  assumptions  made,  the first  period  free
market  price  P*  will equal  the  second  period  price  pt.  Thus  without
credibility  problems,  there  would  be no hoarding,  as waiting  for  tomorrow  will
not  bring  higher  prices  to offset  storage  and interest  costs.  Credibility
problems  in fact  strengthen  this  result.  If p  >  0, there  is a positive
probability  that  second  period  prices  will be lower  than  first  period  prices,
in  case  controls  get  reimposed,  which  would  lead  to capital  losses  rather  than
gains  on inventories  carried  into  period  2.  Thus  with a "cold  turkey"
approach,  hoarding  incentives  work the  other  way: there  are strong
disincentive-s  to hoard.
If dis-hoarding  would  be possible,  a cold turkey  approach  would  thus
lead  to a  very large  observed  net  supply  response,  much larger  than  under
gradualism.  This is  because  in that  case,  if  there  is  any credibility  problem
at all,  goods  will in fact  be pulled  out  of inventories,  for  sale today  rather
than tomorrow.  But  dishoarding  is  not possible  in  our  set-up,  so under  "cold
turkey"  decontrol,  the  case  with zero  inventory  build  up (A  - 0)  will always
obtain.  This  means that  the  line  labeled  HS,,  in  Figure  6, a horizontal  line
at Yct  - Yo  >  Ys - Yo  >  0, represents the  cold turkey case. Thus  the first
result  on the  comparison  between  cold turkey  and  gradualism:  there  will  be no
hoardinx  under  the  cold turkev  aDnroach.25
Cold  Turkey  versus  Gradual  Price  Control
Yc  V  cr  ~  SEct  HSct
Ya-Yn-  5U 
o  p  1
0-
Figure  6
The second  clear  result  relates  to credibility  (the  equilibrium  value
of  p).  Since  P*  >  Pg.  the  VDS schedule  rotates  further,  clockwise  and  still
crossing  the  same  zero point  (compare  VDS,t  with  VDS 8 in Figure  6).  The cold
turkey  equilibrium  is  at the  intersection  of  VDSct  and  HSct,  at Ect.  Since
there  is  no hoarding  under  a cold turkey  approach,  there  will  be a  high
observed  supply  elasticity  and thus  a low  probability  of program  collapse  p,t
(lower,  for  example,  than  p(O)).
For  comparison  of  the  cold  turkey  decontrol  strategy  with  a  gradualist
approach,  consider  two  possible  configurations  for  the latter.  If the initial
distortion  is so small  that  there  would  be no hoarding  at all in the  gradual
case either  (i.e.  A - 0 and  net  supply  equals  Y.),  Cyyy  <  0 would imply  a
smaller  supply  response  per  unit  of price  increase  than  observed  under  the  CT
approach.  This in turn  would  imply  a larger  assessed  probability  of collapse.
So even if there  is  no hoarding  under  gradualism  (mild  initial  distortions  and
A - 0), gradual  programs  will  be less  credible  as cold turkey  programs  if  Cyyy26
< 0. Moreover,  since  A-0  cases  have  been  excluded  (we  only  consider  severely
distorted  cases),  there  will always  be hoarding  under  gradualism.  Therefore
there  is  more of a downward  revision  (or  less  of an upward  revision)  of the
supply  elasticity  than  in the  A - 0  case,  reinforcing  the  result  just derived
for  the  A - 0 case.  In terms  of Figure  6, HS,  falls  below  the line  Y. - YO  at
least  for its  initial  segment,  and cuts  VDS 8 more to the  right.  But  a lower
observed  supply  elasticity  implies  a higher  likelihood  of program  collapse!
If a  negative  initial  supply  response  obtains  for  at least  the lower
ranges  of p (HS  cuts the  left  vertical  axis  below  0), the  results  obtain
unambiguously,  for  any  sign  of C  m:  since  the  cold turkey  equilibrium  is to
the  left  of p(O)  while the  gradualism  equilibrium  in that  case is to the  right
of p(O),  the  collapse  probability  under  gradualism  will always  be higher,
whatever  the  sign  of Cy  is (cf  Figure  6).  Thus cold  turkey  programs  will
unambiguously  be more  credible  than  gradual  programs  that  actually  cause
increasing  shortages  in their  initial  phase (PE8  >  jo(O)):  and even if  gradual
Rrograms  do not  cause  increasing  shortages  (  5 PM(0)).  cold turkey  decontrol
programs  will still  be more credible  if  C  m  < C
5  Conclusion
This  paper  abstracts  from the  question  of  why price  controls  are  used.
Instead  it  asks a different  question,  one  of great  practical  importance.
Assume  that,  for  reasons  good  or bad,  price  controls  are in place;  how should
they  be terminated?  How to escape  from  a period  of controls?  Both the
coordination  failure  and the  signaling  approach  suggest  at most temporary  use
of controls,  in order  to  minimize  output  losses  on the  transition  path towards
lower  inflation.  Should  in  such  an approach  controls  be abolished  "cold
turkey"  or can  a case  be made for  gradualism?  The issue  is in fact  of much
wider importance;  all  of Eastern  Europe  has been living  under  price  controls,
imposed  for  a  very different  reason.  How should  countries  like  Poland  or the
USSR  move towards  price  flexibility,  gradually  or in  a "big  bang"?
Two factors  complicate  the  issue  and  are  at the  core  of this  paper.  In
many cases  price  controls  focus  on commodities  like  basic  grains,  commodities
that  are  eminently  storable  and can  thus  be used in intertemporal  speculation.
Second,  and  as we will show,  not  unrelated,  opposition  to rapid  dismantling  of27
controls  is  often  based  on claims  of low  supply  response,  and greatly
bolstered  if  a strong  supply  response  indeed  fails  to  materialise.  This is
especially  relevant  in places  like  Eastern  Europe,  where  experience  with price
responsive  markets  is limited.  A less  benign  argument  also lends  support  to a
link  between  low  supply  response  and  opposition  to relaxing  controls.
Shortages  create  rents,  and rents  will attract  lobbyists  in favor  of
continuation  of those  policies  that  create  the  rents.
We show the  difficulties  that  these  two  factors  create  for  gradual
decontrol  of prices.  We endogenise  the  probability  of a collapse  of the  reform
program  along  the  lines  of the  recent  literature  about  the  impact  of political
considerations  on economic  policy  (see  in  particular  Alesina  and  Cukierman
(1990))  and  show that  such  endogeneity  in the  presence  of intertemporal
speculation  leads  to  a strong  case  against  gradualism.  Our core  result  is a
forceful  argument  against  gradual  decontrol:  we show that  the  smaller  the
initial  price  increase  is,  the  lower  the  observed  supply  elasticity  and the
greater  the  probability  that  the  program  of reform  will in fact  be abandoned.
These  results  imply  that  the  policy  that  makes  most sense  from a
microeconomic  point  of view (decontrol  immediately)  is also  advisable  from  a
macroeconomic  point  of view.  Credibility  problems,  which  are  at the  core  of
the  transitional  output  losses  that  characterize  most  stabilization  programs,
will be much less  under  a cold turkey  approach  and  so will therefore
transitional  unemployment.
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Appendix:  Consumer  Welfare  and Price  Decontrol
Consider  a voter  facing,  as consumer,  price  decontrol.  Differentiating
his  budget  constraint  around  the  pre-reform  situation  leads  to a simple
expression  for  his  welfare  as a function  of prices  and  quantities:
EdP=  -AR  + (PV_P°)  _,R  (.1 EUd  dP0 (A.1)
=-ARh  (PV-PO) IX
For  given  ration  size,  price  increases  unambiguously  lower  welfare  as there  is
only  a negative  income  effect.  However,  higher  prices  may increase  aggregate
supply  which increases  welfare  at given  prices  as long  as virtual  prices
exceed  posted  prices,  hence  the  second  term in (A.1).
(A.1)  can  be used to solve  for  the  value  of  a at which  price  changes
yield  no welfare  impact  either  way,  a.:
AR  (A.2)
Welfare  maximizing  voters  will vote  yes or no depending  on  whether  their
posterior  ap,  is greater  or smaller  than  ac.  ac  is greater  than  or equal  to
zero  depending  on whether  the  initial  ration  is  greater  than  or equal  to zero.
The  size  of ac  has  no qualitative  impact  on any  of the  results  as long  as it
allows  interior  solutions  (i.e.  between  0 and  1) for  p.PRE  Working  Paper  Series
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